On the Other Hand:
"What is 'True' Religion?"

 

 

No quarrels in human history have led to more 'religious' bloodshed than disagreements over what is professed to be "THE truth," the one and only truth which both sides claim to own. Blind zeal for absolute truth has led 'true believers' of every stripe to attack any and all unbelievers' as less-than-human evil-doers. In all too many contexts this was enough to justify torturing, burning, and killing (religiously). This happened often enough, but one of its worst occurrences was the incredible slaughter in the so-called 'wars of religion' in seventeenth century Europe. Bewildered people were forced to ask: What then is true religion?

Philosopher William James, over a century ago (in A Pluralistic Universe [1909]), tried to work out consensus-criteria for judging at least some of the qualities that should characterize 'true' religion. He came to the conviction that, whatever else one might say, religion should at least be marked by 'philosophically demonstrable rationality.' Of course, many traditionalists would immediately brand this as unacceptable, since their notion of revelation would not allow the placing of any such limit. (They would invariably invoke the text of Paul noting that God's foolishness is wiser than the wisdom of men, a convenient defense of any kind of human
folly).

In struggling with this issue some twenty years ago, Hans Kung sketched four fundamental positions he had encountered in his wide-ranging dialogue with representatives of world religions. Whether they cover all possibilities or not, they are certainly interesting to ponder.

No religion is true. Or, inversely, All religions are equally untrue (many a traditional atheist).

Only one religion is true. Or, negatively, All other religions are untrue. (a traditional view of many Christians and a variety of others).

Every religion is true. Or, All religions are equally true. (cultural relativism of some early social scientists, e.g., E. Troeltsch).

One religion is true and all other religions participate to some degree in the truth of that one religion. (variations of this 'tolerant inclusivism' are found in some religions of Indian origin which often view other religions as preliminary stages or positions of partial truths along the way).

Küng's own nuanced position as a committed Christian theologian after a lifetime of the broadest study, reflection, and dialogue, is that, on the one hand, Christians possess no monopoly on truth; but, on the other hand, they also have no right to forego a confession of truth on the grounds of an arbitrary pluralism. Dialogue and witness do not exclude each other. A confession of truth includes the courage to sift out elements of "untruth" and speak honestly and openly about them, humbly acknowledging one's inevitable limitations and the duty to continue searching.

Experience convinced him that the borders between truth and untruth are not between the religions as such but running through every religion. In other words, not everything in any religion is equally true and good. Religion is in constant need of strong criticism, or it will lapse into corruption. And it is from its own members that this criticism ought principally to come. If they do not help to provide structures that will prevent repression and the silencing of dissent, no one else will. One question, of course, is how the best criteria for doing this can be formulated. The handling of fair and effective criticism from within is an often insurmountable challenge to an institution.

Küng's advice was to give special attention to three different levels in seeking such criteria:

First - appeal to the common humanity of all; this he calls the "General ETHICAL Criterion" and observing it is far more difficult than it seems. It is so tempting to exempt oneself from the demands made of all others.

Second - appeal to a religion's own distinctive teaching (the "General RELIGIOUS Criterion"). If the central resources are not derived from the top values which the religion itself holds dear, they will inevitably come from a lower source, and—human nature being what it is—that may well be by stooping to pragmatic political, economic or self-serving grounds.

And third - appeal to a SPECIFIC criterion of a particular religion, viewing it horizontally, both from the outside (as a neutral observer would) and from the inside (as an adherent should), asking whether it exhibits the spirit of what the religion typically claims to be all about. And viewing it vertically, staying fully aware that no single religion ever has the whole truth. ("God alone has ...is ... the whole truth").

All this may sound overly speculative, partially because it is so novel. The very idea of members of different world religions talking to one another on an equal footing, taking one another seriously as mutually having something to learn from one another, is not part of any of the traditions. As in so many other areas, it is part of the new reality of globalization, for better and for worse. We simply cannot afford to stay in our ghettos and pretend that nothing has changed. Küng has challenged all with this stark declaration: "True humanity is a presupposition of true religion, ...true religion is a fulfillment of true humanity." If you tend to disagree, the only responsible thing to do is to try to discern why, to figure out where, and to specify how, so that your response can help move the conversation forward toward greater peace due to better understanding.

Otherwise, the conflicts of the past are likely to prove to be mild preliminaries of those yet to come.

 

Jim Megivern is Professor Emeritus in Philosophy and Religion at UNC Wilmington. He is a contributing founder of CCV and a regular columnist.



Philosophy & Religion

Carolina Civic Voice

                             Fall 2006  Vol.  6, No 3